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Dans cet article, nous traitons la question de l’o¤re féminine de travail dans
le cadre de l’approche collective (Chiappori, Journal of Political Economy
(1992)). Nous étudions des couples mariés et partons de l4observation em-
pirique que l’o¤re de travail du mari est généralement déterminée par des
contraintes exogènes. Nous montrons alors que, dans ce cas, des éléments
structurels du processus de décision, tels que les préférences individuelles
or la règle qui détermine la répartition intra-familiale du bien-être peut-être
identi…ée á condition que la demande pour au moins un bien est observée con-
jointement avec l’o¤re de travail. Ces considérations théoriques sont suivies
par une application empirique utilisant des données françaises.
Abstract:
In this paper, we deal with female labour supply in the collective framework
(Chiappori, Journal of Political Economy (1992)). We study married couples
and start from the empirical observation that the husband’s labour supply is
generally determined by exogenous constraints. We then show that, in this
case, structural elements of the decision process, such as individual prefer-
ences or the rule that determines the intra-household distribution of welfare,
can be identi…ed if household demand for at least one commodity, together
with the wife’s labour supply, is observed. These theoretical considerations
are followed by an empirical application using French data.
Keywords:
Collective Decisions, Female labour Supply, Commodity Demands, Intra-
household Distribution
JEL classi…cation: D12, J221 Introduction
Traditionally, the household, as a whole, is considered as the elementary
decision unit; in particular, consumption and labour supply decisions are
modeled as though household members were maximizing a unique utility
function under a budget constraint. However, recent dissatisfaction with
this so-called unitary model arose in a large part from the weakness of its
theoretical foundations. We must admit, at least since Arrow’s famous im-
possibility theorem, that a household comprising several adult members does
not necessarily behave as a single rational agent. Furthermore, the speci…c
restrictions imposed by the unitary model have received little empirical sup-
port, if any. In particular, the Income Pooling Hypothesis — according to
which only total exogenous family income, and not its distribution across
members, matters for labour supply and consumption decisions — has been
strongly rejected in many recent studies (see Lundberg and Pollak (1996) for
a survey).
For these reasons, Chiappori (1988, 1992) has proposed a model of labour
supply based upon a collective representation of household behaviour. In this
framework, each person is characterized by speci…c preferences, and decisions
are only assumed to result in Pareto-e¢cient outcomes. He demonstrates
that these simple assumptions are su¢cient to generate testable restrictions
on household labour supply under the form of partial di¤erential equations.
He also shows that, if these restrictions are satis…ed, some elements of the de-
cision process, such as individual preferences and the rule that determines the
distribution of welfare within the household, can be retrieved from the obser-
vation of both labour supplies. More recently, Donni (2000) has extended this
theoretical model to incorporate the possibility of non-participatory decisions
and non-linear budget sets. Apps and Rees (1997) and Chiappori (1997) have
yielded the theoretical basis for introducing household production. Fong and
Zhang (2001) have studied a collective model of labour supply where there
are two distinct types of leisure: one type is each person’s independent (or
private) leisure, and the other type is spousal (or public) leisure.
This setting turns out to be pro…table as shown by several recent em-
pirical applications. For example, Fortin and Lacroix (1996) closely follow
Chiappori’s initial framework. They use a functional form that nests both the
unitary and the collective model as particular cases and …nd, using Cana-
dian data, that the restrictions implied by the unitary setting are strongly
rejected, while the collective ones are not. Chiappori et al. (2001) extend
1the collective models to allow for ‘distribution factors’, de…ned as being any
variable that is exogenous with respect to preferences but may in‡uence the
decision process. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and choosing
the sex ratio and an indicator of the divorce legislation as distribution fac-
tors, they …nd that the restrictions implied by the collective model are not
rejected. Blundell et al. (1998) further develop the collective model to cover
the possibility of discrete choices and unobserved heterogeneity. They ana-
lyze household labour supply using United Kingdom data from 1978 to 1983
and notably …nd that the estimated wage elasticities are not at odds with
intuition.
Still, it appears that, in most studies, the structural parameters describing
the intra-household decision process are not estimated with precision (apart
from the estimates given by Chiappori et al. (2001)). One reason is that, in
most countries, male labour supply is rigid and largely determined by exoge-
nous constraints. For example, only 13 per cent of the working population
in European Union countries have a part-time job: 67 per cent of these are
married women, and the remaining 33 per cent are divided almost equally
between men and single women (Eurostat, 1988). Similar trends, even if less
marked, are observed in the United States: among married couples, about 11
per cent of working men have a part-time job, three times less than working
women (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2000). These facts are the starting point
for the current paper where we focus on the wife’s labour supply and assume
that the husband’s hours of work are constrained at an upper bound.
Understanding the source of such a di¤erence between a wife and hus-
band’s behaviour is a very important research topic but is beyond the scope
of this paper. At this stage, we only admit that, for sociological reasons, the
preferences for leisure are generally lower for the husband than for the wife
while his market wage is higher. This implies that, in most data set, the
husband’s labour supply is generally observed at the current legal (or socio-
cultural) maximum. If so, the usual proof of identi…ability and testability
of the collective approach is no longer valid. A solution is to use addi-
tional information on household behaviour. We thus suppose that the wife’s
labour supply and, at least, one commodity demand are jointly observed.
We demonstrate that this setting allows us to identify some elements of the
intra-household decision process and generate testable restrictions on house-
hold behaviour. We also consider the possibility of non-participation for the
wife and show, in this case, that commodity demands endogenously switch
regimes. This result extends to collective models the theory of household
2behaviour under rationing developed by Neary and Roberts (1980). Finally,
we estimate and test this collective model using French data for couples in
which the husband is working full-time. These data are especially suitable
for our purpose because the French labour market is characteristically rigid.
In the estimation process, we explicitly take into account the possibility of
non-participation for the wife with a Full Information Maximum Likelihood
Method applied to a …ve-equation system. We …nd that the main structural
parameters are fairly well estimated in view of the small size of our sample.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the assumptions
of our framework and Section 3 presents the main theoretical results. Section
4 provides an analysis of our econometric strategy and Section 5 gives a brief
description of the data and the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Collective Approach
2.1 Basic Framework
We consider only the case of married couples (m and f) in a single period
setting.1 The wife’s and husband’s labour supply are respectively denoted
by Lf and Lm with market wages wf and wm. The wife’s and husband’s
demand for commodity n (n = 1;:::;N) are respectively denoted by Cfn
and Cmn with prices set to one. Non-labour income is denoted by y. For
convenience, the spouses’ total time endowment is normalized at one.2 Let
Ci = (Ci1;:::;CiN)0 be the vector of member i’s consumptions (i = m;f).
We adopt the following assumption on preferences.
Assumption A1 Each household member is characterized by speci…c pref-
erences. These can be represented by utility functions of the form: ui(1 ¡
Li;Ci) that are both strongly concave, in…nitely di¤erentiable and strictly
increasing in all their arguments, with limCi!0ui(1 ¡ Li;Ci) = ¡1.
The household members are said to be ‘egoistic’ in the sense that their
utility only depends on their own consumption and leisure. However, all the
1Of course, the fact that the household members are married is not important. The
terminology is just for convenience.
2This upper bound for members’ hours of work can alternatively be seen as a legal or
socio-cultural norm.
3results immediately extend to the case of ‘altruistic’ agents in a Beckerian








where Wi(¢) is a strictly increasing function. The crucial hypothesis is the
existence of some type of separability in the preferences of the two household
members. Finally, let us note that the condition on limits in A1 lets us rule
out the cases where consumption is equal to zero.
We implicitly assume that there is nopublic consumption and no domestic
production. The budget constraint is then written as follows:
y + Lf ¢ wf + Lm ¢ wm >
PN
n (Cfn + Cmn):
Let us remark that, typically, we only observe household purchases of com-
modities within a certain period. Even if we equate these purchases with
consumption, we generally do not observe the individual consumptions for
private commodities. We only observe the aggregate consumption Cn =
Cfn + Cmn.
The main originality of the e¢ciency approach lies in the fact that the
household decisions result in Pareto-e¢cient outcomes and that no additional
assumption is made about the process. This is formally expressed in the
following assumption.
Assumption A2 The outcome of the decision process is Pareto e¢cient;
that is, for any wage-income bundle (wf;wm;y), the labour-consumption
bundle (Lf;Lm;Cf;Cm) chosen by the household issuch that no otherbundle
(Lf¤;Lm¤;Cf¤;Cm¤) in the budget set could make both members better o¤.
This assumption has a good deal of intuitive appeal. First of all, the
household is one of the preeminent examples of a repeated game. Then, given
the symmetry of information, it is plausible that agents …nd mechanisms to
support e¢cient outcomes since cooperation often emerges as a long term
equilibrium of repeated noncooperative relations. A second point is that
axiomatic models of bargaining with symmetric information, such as Nash or
Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining, which have been previously used to analyze
negotiation within the household (Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy
and Horney (1981)), assume e¢cient outcomes.
4Pareto-e¢ciency essentially means that there exists a scalar ¹ such that
the household behaviour is a solution to the following program:
max
fLf;Lm;Cf;Cmg
(1 ¡ ¹) ¢ u
f(1 ¡L
f;C
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i > 0 and C
i > 0 i = f;m.
The parameter ¹ has an obvious interpretation as a ‘distribution of power’
index. If ¹ = 0, then the household behaves as though the wife always gets
her way whereas, if ¹ = 1; it is as if the husband is the e¤ective dictator.
Practically, some structure is added to the decision process. To obtain
well-behaved labour supplies and commodity demands, we assume that the
scalar ¹ 2 ]0;1[ is a single-valued and in…nitely di¤erentiable function of
wf;wm and y. The underlying idea is that, within a bargaining context,
the threat point is expected to depend on non-labour income and the wage
that the spouses receive when they work. If so, most cooperative equilibrium
concepts imply that ¹ is a function of wf;wm and y.
2.2 Decentralization and Rationing
We say that a pair of labour supplies and a pair of systems of commodity
demands are consistent with collective rationality if A1 and A2 are jointly
ful…lled. The next step is to de…ne what we call the sharing rule. To do this,
we use the following lemma.
Lemma A pair of labour supplies ¹ Li(wf;wm;y) and a pair of systems of N
commodity demands ¹ Ci(wf;wm;y) are consistent with collective rationality if
and only if there exists a pair of functions ½i(wf;wm;y) with
P
½i = y such








n Cin = ½i + Li ¢ wi
and 1 > Li > 0; Ci > 0 ,
for any (wf;wm;y) 2 IR2
++£ IR.
5Proof. An application of the First and the Second Theorems of Welfare Eco-
nomics, which state the equivalence between e¢ciency and a decentralized
equilibrium when there are no externalities.
This lemma has several important consequences. Speci…cally, it deter-
mines the functional structure of labour supplies and commodity demands.
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tional Marshallian labour supplies and commodity demands. In particular,







For convenience, the wife’s share ½ is called the sharing rule. The latter is
generally a function of all the exogenous variables.
For treating corner solutions, we must develop a ‘collective’ theory of
household behaviourunder(endogenous) rationing.3 We followthe procedure
used by Neary and Roberts (1980) for standard systems of demands. When
the wife is rationed on the labour market, her actual wage is replaced in
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R ¢ wf + ½;L
f
R) + ³
mn(wm;y ¡ ½), (5)
3We may expect that, in the case of exogenous rationing, the sharing rule is a function
of the ‘scale’ of rationing. Since we are only interested in dealing with corner solutions,
we exclude this possibility. This does, however, provide an interesting direction for future
research.
6where the de…nition (4) is used in the second line. This expression (5) means
that, in the case of rationing, commodity demands switch regimes: an in-
crease in the wife’s wage only hasan income e¤ect on household consumption.
This is in line with the traditional setting where a single utility function is
assumed. However, we must note that, in collective models, an increase in
the wife’s (market) wage generally has an impact on household consumption
through the sharing rule, even when the wife does not work, i.e., L
f
R = 0.
We also have the following cases. When the husband is rationed on the
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R): (7)
In this case, we obtain the model of pure consumption studied in a recent
working paper by Bourguignon et al. (1995).
2.3 The Benchmark Case: Both Household Members
Are Unrationed.
Traditionally, both household members are assumed to be unrationed. Pre-
cisely, it is implicitly assumed that (wf;wm;y) 2 R where R is a partition of
IR2
++£ IR de…ned by
(wf;wm;y) 2 R i¤ 1 > ¹ L
f > 0 and 1 > ¹ L
m > 0:
As pointed out by Chiappori (1988, 1992), such a framework, where labour
supplies are ‡exible and characterized by (1) and (2), has two interesting
properties for empirical implementations. First, it is su¢cient for generating
testable restrictions on labour supplies under the form of partial di¤erential
equations. These equations can be viewed as analogous, in the collective set-
ting, to Slutsky relations in the traditional model and they can be translated
into restrictions on parameters which may in turn either be tested statisti-
cally or be used a priori for reducing the estimation task. Second, it allows
us to recover, from the observed behaviour, individual preferences and the
outcome of the decision process — the sharing rule. This setting is slightly
7extended in Donni (2000) to cover the cases where one person in the house-
hold does not participate to the labour market.
However, the main theoretical results on collective labour supply always
suppose that the set R is observed by the economist. This is excessively
restrictive. In most countries, the husband’s labour supply is …xed at the
upper bound (¹ Lm = 1, in our notation) for the majority of households and
equal to zero for a minority of them. Moreover, there is obviously nothing
to say about the testability or the identi…ability of the collective approach if
only the wife’s labour supply is taken into account.4 Blundell et al. (1998)
accept as a fact these rigidities in the husband’s behaviour but they show that
the sharing rule can be identi…ed from observation of wife’s labour supply
and husband’s participation decision. However, they do not explain why the
husband’s choices (contrary to wife’s choices) are discrete. In addition, they
suppose that husband’s non-participation to the labour market is voluntary.
This assumption is possible in the United-Kingdom, where the labour market
is competitive, but more debatable in other countries. In what follows, we
deal with this problem in another way.
3 Collective Female Labour Supply
3.1 Preliminary Considerations
In our approach, we do not reappraise the fact that the husband’s labour
supply is generally …xed at the upperbound. Thisisconsistent with empirical
evidence as well as classical work based on the unitary setting (e.g., Heckman
(1974) or Mroz (1987)). It is plausible that, for sociological reasons, the
preferences for leisure are lower for the husband than for the wife while his
market wage is higher. These considerations lead us to assume that (wf;wm;
y) 2 P where P is a partition of IR2
++£ IR de…ned by
(wf;wm;y) 2 P i¤ 1 > ¹ L
f > 0 and ¹ L
m = 1:
In other words, we assume that husbands are endogenously rationed on the
labour market. Practically, the few households remaining where the husband
4This is not true for the unitary approach. We have testable constraints on the wife’s
behaviour: ¹ Lf
y = ¹ Lf
wm (Income Pooling) and ¹ Lf
wf ¡ ¹ Lf ¢ ¹ Lf
y > 0 (Slutsky Positivity).
Furthermore, the ‘household’ preferences between the wife’s leisure and consumption can
be identi…ed from observation of the wife’s labour supply.
8does not work are explained by an exogenous rationing, e.g., involuntary
unemployment, and are neglected.
The idea of this paper is to use information on household consumption to
identify the sharing rule and derive testable restrictions. Therefore, we study
the wife’s labour supply and household commodity demands in a uni…ed
framework.
3.2 Identifying the Sharing Rule
First, we assume that only one commodity demand, together with the wife’s
labour supply, is observed. We recall that when the husband’s labour supply








? (y + wm ¡ ½;1),
where the sum of non-labour income and husband’s wage is the ‘exoge-
nous’ household income. Moreover, under our assumptions, ¹ Lf(wf;wm;y)
and ¹ Cn(wf;wm;y) as well as ½(wf;wm;y) are in…nitely di¤erentiable in all
their arguments on int(P). To simplify the derivation of the results, let us




y ¢ ¹ Lf
wm ¡ ¹ Lf










wm ¡ ¹ Lf
y
®n
y ¢ ¹ L
f
wm ¡®n




if denominators are di¤erent from zero, where the notation Fx stands for the
partial di¤erential of function F with respect to variable x. As we will show
below (see the proof of Proposition 1), ®n corresponds to the slope of the
husband’s nth commodity demand while ¯
n is the inverse of the derivative
of this slope. Let us now assume that the functions that we consider satisfy
some regularity conditions.



















for any (wf;wm;y) 2 int(P).
9These conditions can be interpreted as follows. The …rst condition obvi-
ously implies the absence of income pooling in the wife’s labour supply, i.e.,
the impact of the husband’s wage and the impact of non-labourincome on the
wife’s labour supply have to be di¤erent. The second condition can be seen,
in a certain sense, as a generalization of this assumption for the husband’s
nth commodity demand since ®n corresponds to the slope of this demand.
The third condition is slightly more complicated. It implies, in view of the
de…nition of ¯
n, that the second derivative of the husband’s nth commodity
demand is di¤erent from zero. Finally, let us remark that these conditions
are generically true in the usual sense. However, they exclude the demand





and the demand for commodities which are exclusively consumed by the wife.
We can now put forward the next result which says that, in the present
setting, some elements of the wife’s preferences and the sharing rule can be
retrieved.
Proposition 1 Let ¹ Lf(wf;wm;y) be the wife’s labour supply and ¹ Cn(wf;
wm;y) the nth commodity demand. Let us assume Collective Rationality
and R1. Then, the sharing rule can be retrieved on P up to a constant ².




n, ½wm = 1 ¡®
n
wm ¢ ¯




Moreover, for each choice of ², the wife’s preferences between total consump-
tion and leisure (i.e., the marginal rate of substitution) are uniquely de…ned.
Finally, the individual nth commodity demands can also be retrieved up to a
constant ²n.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We brie‡y sketch the basic steps of the proof. The idea is that changes
either in non-labour income or in the husband’s wage can have only an in-
come e¤ect; speci…cally, they will a¤ect the wife’s labour supply only insofar
as her share of exogenous income, as de…ned by the sharing rule, is modi…ed.
This means that any simultaneous change in non-labour income and the hus-
band’s wage that leaves the wife’s labour supply unchanged must keep her
10share constant as well. From this idea, it is possible to measure the e¤ect
of exogenous income on commodity demand, keeping the wife’s share un-
changed. This yields the husband’s Engel curve ®n. Once the husband’s En-
gel curve is retrieved, it is possible to obtain other structural elements, such
as the sharing rule or the wife’s Engel curve, by di¤erentiation of this Engel
curve and resolution of the resulting system of partial di¤erential equations.
Knowing the sharing rule allows us to write down the wife’s actual budget
constraint and to compute her preferences in the usual way.
3.3 Testing Collective Rationality
3.3.1 One Commodity Demand
The next result gives a set of testable restrictions that the wife’s labour
supply and the commodity demand have to satisfy.
Proposition 2 Let ¹ Lf(wf;wm;y) be the wife’s labour supply and ¹ Cn(wf;







































for any (wf;wm;y) 2 int(P).
Proof. See the Appendix.
These restrictions provide a joint test of collective rationality under spe-
ci…c assumptions, namely, egoistic (or altruistic in a Beckerian sense) agents
and absence of public consumption and domestic production. The …rst con-
dition corresponds to the Slutsky Positivity translated in the collective ap-
proach. The second condition results from the separability property of the
behavioural functions: husband’s wage and non-labour income a¤ect the
household behaviour only through the sharing rule.
113.3.2 Several Commodity Demands
More can be obtained when the demand for several commodities, rather
than a single one, is observed. This is formally expressed in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 Let ¹ Lf(wf;wm;y) be the wife’s labour supply and ¹ Cn1(wf;
wm;y) and ¹ Cn2(wf;wm;y) two commodity demands. Let us assume Collec-


















for any (wf;wm;y) 2 int(P).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The di¤erence with the case of only one commodity is that the constraints
here are based on a second, rather than a third order partial di¤erential
equation, which is more restrictive. In particular, for the functional form
that we use in the empirical application of this paper, the second condition
of Proposition 2 is automatically satis…ed and the test of collective rationality
is based only on the condition of Proposition 3.
3.4 Extension: The Wife’s Rationing
One of the main limitations of the preceding results is the assumption that
the wife is free to vary the hours she works. However, this is a fact: many
wives choose not to work at all or to work full-time, two cases ruled out in the
earlier discussion. This is the motivation for this section. We only consider
the wife’s decision to participate in the labour market but the results can
easily be extended to the converse case of working full-time.
To begin with, we note that the existence of a well-behaved participation
frontier does not stem from the theoretical set-up as in standard labour
supply models, but has to be postulated.5 We, therefore, use the following
5A formal discussion of this point is given in Donni (2000). The underlying idea is that
in the collective approach, when the wife is indi¤erent between working and not-working,
an increase in the wife’s wage also has an income e¤ect on labour supply (through the
sharing rule). Therefore, the traditional argument for the uniqueness of the reservation
wage is no longer valid. To exclude the possibility of multiple reservation wages, we can use
a convenient assumption on preferences and the sharing rule. However, in what follows,
we adopt a more direct approach.
12assumption:
Assumption R2 There exists a positive function °(wm;y) de…ned on IR++
£ IR such that the wife does not participate in the labour market if and only
if wf 6 °(wm;y).
We assume that, although the wife does not work, we observe her market
wage wf. We now consider the set N where N is a connected partition of
IR2
++£ IR de…ned by
(wf;wm;y) 2 N i¤ ¹ L
f = 0 and ¹ L
m = 1:
We also de…ne I ´ f(wm;y)j(wf;wm;y) 2 N and wf = °(wm;y)g. An
illustration of these sets is given, for a …xed y, in Figure 1. In this …gure, two
points must be stressed. First, the wife does not participate in the labour
market when her wage is below its reservation value. Second, the husband’s
labour supply falls below 1 for some wages which are particularly low or high
but these extreme values are not of interest to us. Finally, we assume that




? (½;0) + ³
mn
? (y + wm ¡ ½;1),
on N and the participation frontier, de…ned as wf = °(wm;y), on I.
As we show below, this framework yields su¢cient information to identify
the sharing rule and generate testable restrictions. First, let us note that,
under our assumptions, commodity demands and the participation frontier
are in…nitely di¤erentiable respectively on int(N) and on I. Moreover, along
the participation frontier, the nth commodity demand can be written as
follows:
^ C
n(wm;y) = ¹ C
n(°(wm;y);wm;y).












y ¡ °y ¢ An
wm
,
if the denominators are di¤erent from zero. The interpretation is now fa-
miliar: An corresponds to the slope of the husband’s commodity demand
along the participation frontier while Bn is the inverse of the derivative of
this slope. Let us now assume that the behavioural functions at stake satisfy
some regularity conditions.
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Figure 1: Non-participation set and participation frontier
14Assumption R3 The wife’s participation frontier and the nth commodity
demand are such that




y and °wm ¢ A
n





wm 6= ^ C
n
y ,
for any (wm;y) 2 I.
The …rst three equations are required to identify the sharing rule along
the participation frontier. The last is required to identify the sharing rule on
int(C).
The next result says, …rst, that the sharing rule can be retrieved on N
up to a constant and, second, that testable restrictions are generated.
Proposition 4 Let °(wm;y) be the wife’s participation frontier and ¹ Cn(wf;
wm;y) the nth commodity demand. Let us assume Collective Rationality, R2
and R3. Then, the sharing rule can be retrieved on N up to a constant ².
Speci…cally, let À(wm;y) = ½(°(wm;y);wm;y) be the sharing rule along the
participation frontier, then the derivatives of the sharing rule on I are given
by
Àwm = 1 ¡ A
n
wm ¢ B




Moreover, the individual nth commodity demand can be retrieved up to a










for any (wm;y) 2 I.
Proof. See the Appendix.
At this stage, some precisions are necessary. First, the proof of this
proposition does not require the complete speci…cation of the underlying
wife’s labour supply but only the speci…cation of the participation frontier.
This result is very useful since the number of hours of work is not always
provided in data sets. Often the information contained in consumer sur-
veys is only concerned with the participation decision of household mem-
bers. Second, considering additional commodity demands obviously creates
new constraints. These are not formally examined in this paper. In fact,
15this setting with double rationing can be interpreted as a model of pure con-
sumption. This kind of model has received great attention in Bourguignon et
al. (1995). These authors derive the whole set of testable constraints. They
also show that the sharing rule can be identi…ed from any triplet of com-
modity demands. Therefore, a test of continuity of the sharing rule consists
in comparing the sharing rule obtained from three commodity demands and
the one given in Proposition 4. Finally, this result completes the identi…ca-
tion property given in Proposition 1 and assures us that the sharing rule is
identi…ed on the entire set of wf;wm and y which is relevant for empirical
applications.
4 Econometric Analysis
We consider in this section the empirical implementation of the model de-
scribed above. First, we propose a functional form for the labour supply and
the system of commodity demands. Second, we introduce stochastic terms
and derive the log-likelihood function.
4.1 Functional Form
In this section and those that follow, we adopt the following conventions:
wfh denotes the wife’s hourly wage in household h, wmh the husband’s hourly
wage, yh the monthly non-labour income, Lfh the observed number of worked
hours per month, Cn
h the expenditure on commodity n per month and T the
(legal or socio-cultural) maximum number of hours per month.
4.1.1 Labour Supply and Commodity Demands
In order to estimate and test this model, we adopt the linear functional form,
initially proposed by Hausman (1981), for the wife’s latent labour supply. If
we neglect the stochastic terms at this stage, we have:
L
¤
fh = ®h + ¯ ¢ wfh + ° ¢ ½h,
where L¤
fh is the wife’s latent number of worked hours per month. The wife
is rationed on the labour market if the latent variable is either greater than
T or lower than 0:
Lfh = T if L
¤
fh > T, Lfh = 0 if L
¤
fh 6 0,
16and Lfh = L
¤
fh otherwise.




where zjfh are socio-demographic characteristics relevant for explaining the
wife’s behaviour (e.g., the wife’s age, the region of the household, the number
of children and so on). Finally, Slutsky Positivity is globally ful…lled if and
only if ¯ > 0 and ° 6 0.
This speci…cation has several desirable properties. First, the linear form
for labour supply has been frequently used in empirical studies and is suitable
for French data (see Bourguignon and Magnac (1990) for another applica-
tion).6 Second, the wife’s preferences between leisure and consumption have
a well-known form (see Hausman (1980) or Stern (1986), for examples). Pre-
cisely, they are given by the following indirect utility function:









Third, this speci…cation permits us to recover a closed form for shadow wages
which are used to compute rationed commodity demands. Of course, the
main limitation of the linear functional form is its lack of ‡exibility; in par-
ticular, it implies that the labour supply curve is either upward sloping every-
where or backward bending everywhere.
We now consider the functional form of the commodity demands. To
begin with, let us recall that the previous theory states that identi…cation
of the sharing rule relies on the non-linearity of the husband’s commodity
demands. We thus assume that, when 0 < L¤
fh < T, the nth commodity







f ¢ wfh + c
n








m ¢ (yh + wmhT ¡ ½h) + d
n
m ¢ (yh + wmhT ¡ ½h)
2:
This functional form switches regimes in the case of rationing. Two cases
must be considered. First, when L¤
fh 6 0, we compute the shadow wage as
follows:
!fh = ¡
®fh + °f ¢ ½h
¯f
,
6Other speci…cations for the wife’s labour supply have unsuccessfully been tried. In
particular, we introduced a square term for the wife’s share in the labour equation but it
proved to be insigni…cant.







f ¢ !fh + c
n








m ¢ (yh + wmhT ¡ ½h) + d
n
m ¢ (yh + wmhT ¡ ½h)
2:
Second, when L¤
fh > T, the shadow wage becomes:
!fh =
T ¡ ®fh ¡ °f ¢ (wfhT + ½h)
¯f ¡ °f ¢ T
,
and we introduce this expression in the nth commodity demand. Since this







f ¢ !fh + c
n
f ¢ ((wfh ¡ !fh)T + ½h) + d
n






m ¢ (yh + wmhT ¡ ½h) + d
n
m ¢ (yh + wmhT ¡ ½h)
2:
This speci…cation re‡ects the facts that (i) commodity demands are continu-
ous everywhere, in particular, along the frontiers where the regime switches,
and (ii) an increase in the wife’s wage, in the case of rationing, only has an
income e¤ect on consumption. Finally, since individual intercepts cannot be











where zjh are socio-demographic characteristics relevant for explaining both
spouses’ behaviour.
4.1.2 The Sharing Rule and the Collective Constraints
As in Fortin and Lacroix (1997) and Blundell et al. (1998), we adopt a linear
speci…cation for the sharing rule:
½h = A ¢ wfhT + B ¢ wmhT + C ¢ yh. (9)
Although the sign of the parameters is not formally determined by the model
above, the intuition suggests that
0 < B < C < 1:
However, the coe¢cient A can be either positive or negative since its sign
results from two opposite e¤ects. For one, we may expect that the wife
18transfers part of her welfare gains to her partner if her wage rises and she
is working. This is what we call a ‘welfare e¤ect’. However, she probably
improves her bargaining power at the same time. This is a ‘distribution ef-
fect’. Therefore, she could also obtain money from her husband. The latter
situation is likely prevalent if the welfare gains resulting from the wage in-
crease are small enough (notably if the wife does not work).7 Precisely, we
can show, using (8) and (9), that the wife takes advantage of an increase in
her wage, for the present speci…cation, only if
Lfh + A¢ T > 0: (10)
To test collective rationality, we must derive the unconstrained model that
corresponds to the present speci…cation. We adopt the approach followed by
Browning et al. (1994). The crucial point here is that there is an equivalence
between collective rationality and the existence of a single sharing rule in all
the equations. Moreover, at least one commodity demand, together with the
wife’s labour supply, is required to identify the sharing rule. Precisely, let us
write the sharing rule as follows:
½h = A¢ wfhT + B ¢ (wmhT + © ¢ yh),
where © = C=B: First, we identify © from the estimation of the wife’s labour
supply. Then, we identify A and B from the estimation of one commodity
demand (say n = 1, without loss of generality). Thus, the strategy for testing




n ¢ wfhT + B
n ¢ (wmhT + © ¢ yh),
for each additional commodity demand, and checking the following equali-
ties:
A
n = A and B
n = B,
for any n > 1.
4.2 Stochastic Speci…cation and Likelihood Function
We have to make some allowance for stochastic terms in the right-hand side
of these equations. There are several potential source of such randomness:
7These two e¤ects could be modelled by assuming that the sharing rule switches regimes
in the case of rationing. However, this raises further problems with the logical consistency
of this model.
19unobservable heterogeneity in preferences or in the sharing rule and optimiza-
tion/measurement errors in observations. The most satisfactory treatment
would be to allow for each of these and then to develop a full stochastic model
(see Blundell et al. (1998) for such an attempt in another context). Still this
raises issues related to the identi…cation of these terms. We adopt a much
more conventional approach of simply adding error terms to each equation:
Àh for the wife’s labour supply and "n
h for the nth commodity demand.
We assume that the vector (Àh;"1
h;:::;"N
h ) follows a multidimensional
normal distribution with mean zero and a covariance matrix given by
§ if 0 < L
¤
fh < T,










where § is a matrix of free parameters and ¡0 and ¡1 are identity matrices
with free parameters instead of zeros in the …rst column. This speci…cation
is a convenient approximation when stochastic terms in the wife’s labour
supply result from a mix of unobservable taste heterogeneity and optimiza-
tion/measurement errors (see Kooreman et Kapteyn (1986) on this point).
This re‡ects the fact that, in the case of rationing, the taste heterogeneity
in the wife’s labour supply is introduced into commodity demands through
shadow wages.
These assumptions, with the relationships de…ned above, directly induce
a distribution on hours of work and quantities of commodity. There are three
states of the world. Wives are either unrationed, or rationed at 0 or rationed











the relationship between observations and stochastic terms. The density for















where Á§ denotes the multidimensional normal density with a mean of zero
and a matrix § of covariances and where the determinant of the Jacobian
matrix for the variable transformation is equal to one. Then the contribution
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This function can be estimated by numerical algorithms. A critical assump-
tion maintained in the above analysis concerns the observability of the wage
for all wives. This is of course not the case for unemployed women. The
approach used thus constructs a …tted value ^ wfh for the wage using familiar
censored regression techniques and interprets ^ wfh as the wage faced by all
workers. In comparison with the procedure which consists in replacing only
wages for unemployed women, this method has the advantage of limiting
the endogeneity problems associated with wfh. If commodity demands are
non-linear, however, this method may lead to inconsistent estimators.
5 Data and Empirical Results
In this section we present the main results. First we describe the data set,
then we give the estimated coe¢cients and the statistics for the test of the
collective constraints.
5.1 The Data
Data are drawn from the household survey “Budget des Familles” conducted
by the national institute of economic and statistical information of France in
21a sample of 12000 French households in 1984–85. The survey was designed to
the analyze living standards and contains detailed information on earnings
and income from property and transfers, on expenditures for nondurable
as well as durable commodities, on most socio-demographic characteristics
of individuals and households and, …nally, on the number of hours and the
work status of individuals. Several studies have exploited this survey over the
last 10 years (e.g., Bourguignon et al. (1993)) and it permits some interesting
comparisons to be made.
From the original sample, we select a subsample of married couples with
the husband working full-time (whose monthly labour supply is comprised
between 140 and 180 hours, but normalized at T = 160) and, at the most, one
child between 3 and 18 yearsold. We also restrict the sample to coupleswhere
the husband and the wife (if working) are not self-employed. These selection
rules and the exclusion of missing data leave us with a total of 739 cases
for the empirical analysis. Ideally, we should have selected a subsample of
couples without children. Children and expenditures on them may actually
be considered as public commodities for both parents, whereas the model
considered above only allows for private commodities. Moreover, children
are expected to increase problems related to household production. It turns
out however that considering only childless couples restricts the size of our
sample too much.
The wife’s labour supply is the number of hours worked per month. It is
computed by multiplying the number of reported weekly hours by 4.2. Ex-
penditures on nondurable commodities are recorded in the survey on diaries
covering two-week periods and extrapolated for the year.8 In the empirical
application, we calculate monthly expenditures on food (at home and away),
clothing (for male, female and children), recreation (including books, disks,
vacations and sporting goods) and transport (excluding purchases of vehi-
cles) respectively. Practically, there may be problems due to the infrequency
of purchases. However, this must not be overestimated because the com-
modities that we consider are very aggregated and the lumpiness in these
expenditures is negligible.
The wife’s hourly wage is computed as the monthly wage net of social
contributions but including overtime, premiums, pensions, and a monetary
evaluation of bene…ts in kind divided by the number of hours worked. This
8Expenditures on clothing are recorded over a two-month period, but this di¤erence
with other nondurables is not taken into account.
22Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Mean St. Dev.
Endogenous Variables
Wife’s Monthly Hours of Labour (LAB) 106 74
Percentage of zeros 31
Monthly Food Expenditures* (FOO) 2431 1119
Percentage of zeros 0
Monthly Clothing Expenditures* (CLO) 655 683
Percentage of zeros 8
Monthly Recreation Expenditures* (REC) 601 707
Percentage of zeros 1
Monthly Transport Expenditures* (TRA) 878 959
Percentage of zeros 6
Exogenous Variables
Wife’s Hourly Wage (Actual) £ 160* 5021 1707
Wife’s Hourly Wage (Predicted) £ 160* 4696 964
Husband’s Hourly Wage £ 160* 6658 3134
Monthly Nonlabour Income* 299 1435
Wife’s Age 39 11
Husband’s Age 41 11
Paris Region (0–1) 0.15 0.36
Rural Region (0–1) 0.25 0.43
Presence of a child (0–1) 0.44 0.49
Number of observations 739
Note: *In French francs.
23wage is then replaced for all observations by the …tted values derived from
a conventional wage equation estimated for participating wives with a cor-
rection for the selection bias.9 The husband’s hourly wage is de…ned in the
same way as the wife’s hourly wage. The monthly non-labour income in-
cludes various transfers and income from di¤erent types of assets (including
child bene…ts) and the virtual income of home owner-occupiers, certainly the
most important asset return. The latter is not directly observed but com-
puted as the …tted values of an equation estimated on renting households.
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics of the sample.
5.2 Parameter Estimates
We have estimated 54 structural parameters; 7 for the wife’s labour supply,
11 for each commodity demand and 3 for the sharing rule. These are pre-
sented in Table 2. We …rst note that only 15 parameters are statistically
signi…cant at the 5% level. We then compute the statistics for the score
test, using the unconstrained model previously derived, to check collective
rationality. This statistic, which follows a Â2 distribution with 6 degrees of
freedom, is equal to 8.804 with a p-value of 0.185. In other words, the data
that we consider do not reject the e¢ciency hypothesis. This con…rms tests
previously performed with the same data set by Bourguignon et al. (1993).
We can now consider the estimated parameters of the wife’s labour sup-
ply. All the coe¢cients have the expected sign (apart perhaps from those of
the region dummies), and the Slutsky Positivity is globally satis…ed: Never-
theless, the scale of both the wage coe¢cient (¯) and the share coe¢cient (°)
strongly contrasts with the one provided by traditional studies with French
data (see for example Bourguignon and Magnac (1990)). Precisely, the im-
pact of the wife’s wage is positive, but insigni…cant and unusually small, with
a corresponding elasticity, computed at the average point of the sample, equal
to 0.226. On the contrary, the impact of the wife’s share is especially large
in terms of absolute value (the corresponding elasticity cannot be calculated
since we do not observe the share of each household member). There are at
least two explanations for these features. First, these coe¢cients are obvi-
ously the structural parameters of a collective model and they have to be
9This regression includes, among the explanatory variables, the wife’s education (mea-
sured in years), the square and the cube of this variable, the wife’s age, a cross-term
of education and age, an indicator of the labour market tension, dummies for the wife’s
nationality, for the region and for households with a telephone.
24Table 2: FIML Parameter Estimates
Parameters of the behavioural Equations
LAB FOO CLO REC TRA
Intercept 267.4 136.5 384.5 60.2 664.0
(60.3) (499.8) (256.7) (314.2) (587.2)
Wife’s Wage 0.816 1.929 1.281 0.745 9.024
(2.529) (5.928) (4.180) (2.676) (27.801)
Wife’s Share -96.5 -154.4 -143.4 -82.1 -692.9
(43.9) (188.4) (149.5) (148.2) (438.0)
Wife’s Share exp2 — 57.2 33.7 -7.7 -46.1
(52.3) (38.8) (36.0) (73.5)
Husband’s Share — 283.3 97.9 124.8 173.6
(69.8) (40.7) (51.7) (75.0)
Husband’s Share exp2 — -6.0 -2.0 -1.9 -3.7
(2.8) (1.7) (2.3) (3.2)
Socio-demographics
One Child 4–18 years -15.7 322.4 -21.8 -36.0 -50.4
(20.5) (99.8) (74.4) (75.8) (160.7)
Paris Region -45.1 168.9 -177.6 163.2 -523.0
(34.2) (160.6) (122.5) (123.7) (242.9)
Rural Region 12.1 84.8 -35.8 -107.9 91.8
(25.4) (131.4) (95.8) (110.6) (210.0)
Wife’s Age -6.0 0.2 -22.5 -1.0 -34.9
(1.1) (14.0) (10.1) (11.5) (14.5)
Husband’s Age — -0.6 9.9 -7.2 -8.0
(12.0) (8.0) (10.7) (9.6)
Parameters of the Sharing Rule
Wife’s Wage £ 160 -0.468
(0.205)




Note: 1) Standard deviations are in brackets,.
2) The variables in the sharing rule are in thousands of francs.
25interpreted in view of the estimated parameters of the sharing rule. Sec-
ond, we assume here that the number of hours worked has an upper bound,
de…ned by a legal or socio-cultural maximum, and is …xed at 160.
We do not dwell on the estimated parameters of the commodity demands
since these cannot be directly interpreted (the corresponding elasticities can-
not be calculated either). Still, it is worth remarking that, in these equations,
the parameters related to the husband’s behaviour are fairly well estimated
(most of them are signi…cant at the 5% level) in comparison with those
related to the wife’s behaviour. A possible explanation is suggested by the
proof of Proposition 2 where we show that the identi…cation of the husband’s
Engel curves relies on the …rst derivatives of the wife’s labour supply and the
household commodity demands whereas the wife’s Engel curves are derived
as a by-product of the derivative of the husband’s Engel curves. As for the
control variables, let us note that the child dummy is signi…cant (with a pos-
itive sign) in the food equation while the Paris dummy is signi…cant (with a
negative sign) in the transport equation. On the other hand, the wife’s age is
signi…cant (with a negative sign) in the clothing and the transport equation.
We now turn to the estimated parameters of the sharing rule. These
are statistically signi…cant at the 5% level and can be interpreted as follows.
First, a one thousand franc increase in the wife’s potential wage (normalized
at 160 hours) decreases the wife’s share by 468 francs. This means that the
wife partially transfers her gains in utility to her husband. This also explains
why the wage coe¢cient in the wife’s labour supply is so small. Actually,
we can show, using (10), that the wife gains from a wage increase only if her
labour supply is greater than 74.9 hours per month. Second, a one thousand
franc increase in the husband’s wage (normalized at 160 hours) increases the
wife’s share by only 146 francs. That is, only a small part of the husband’s
wage goes to the wife. Consequently, the share coe¢cient in the wife’s labour
supply is unusually great (in terms of absolute value) compared to estimates
given by unitary models. Third, a one thousand franc increase in non-labour
income increasesthe wife’sshare by 464francs and the husband’sshareby 536
francs. We can say that non-labour income is almost equally divided between
household members. Chiappori et al. (2001) provide estimates of the same
order for the parameters of the sharing rule. Still, the most remarkable fact
here is the precision of the estimates given in Table 2 considering the small
size of our sample. Previous studies which use the husband’s behaviour to
identify the sharing rule yield standard deviations for structural parameters
which are much greater. Finally, the estimated parameters of the sharing
26rule can be used to test the income pooling hypothesis. The latter implies
that the husband’s wage and non-labour income have the same impact on
the sharing rule. We can use the Wald test to check this assumption. This
statistic, which follows a Â2 distribution with 1 degree of freedom, is equal
to 4.494 with a p-value of 0.034. Therefore, the income pooling hypothesis
is rejected as required for identifying this model.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we start from the assumption that the husband’s hours of work
are …xed at a legal maximum and we consider the wife’s labour supply and
household commodity demands in a uni…ed framework. We …rst show that
structural elements of the decision process can be identi…ed with a single
commodity demand. Second, we generate a set of conditions under the form
of partial di¤erential equations which can be used to statistically test the
collective setting. Finally, we conclude with an empirical illustration using
French data. These empirical results show that the structural parameters
describing the intra-household decision process and the husband’s behaviour
are fairly well estimated.
The rigidity of the husband’s labour supply is certainly a good approxi-
mation for most countries. Moreover, we expect that using information on
household consumption will generally provide precise and robust estimates of
the main structural parameters. The collective approach to household con-
sumption is indeed a promising research program as shown by preliminary
investigations by Bourguignon et al. (1993) or Browning et al. (1994). Still,
several theoretical extensions (e.g., …xed costs of participation, non-linear
income taxation, or involuntary unemployment) are necessary to properly
assess the present setting. Above all, future research should stress the sto-
chastic speci…cation and the functional form that we have adopted. Speci…-
cally, the linearity of the wife’s labour supply is certainly a severe limitation.
However, a more ‡exible speci…cation does not allow us to recover a closed
form for the shadow wages which are used to incorporate rationings in the
model.
Finally, we should stress one point in particular. The collective model of
female labour supply, under the speci…c assumptions that we have adopted,
encompasses the corresponding unitary model with labour supply and com-
modity demands. Therefore, the potential drawbacks of our theoretical set-
27up (e.g., an absence of public consumption or domestic production) are some-
how or other in the unitary model of female labour supply. This generaliza-
tion of the unitary model is convenient since the collective constraints are
not rejected by the data.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1






y ¢ ½wm = ¹ L
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wm ¢ ½y. (11)
Then we use this equation to di¤erentiate the nth commodity demand along
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28Similarly, we can di¤erentiate the nth commodity demand with respect to y,





wm ¢ ¹ Cn
y ¡ ®n



















Finally, knowing the sharing rule allows us to write down the wife’s actual
budget constraint and her preferences can be computed in the usual way.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
If we introduce the derivatives of the wife’s labour supply, given by (17), in
the Slutsky Positivity condition, we obtain the …rst condition in the state-
ment of the proposition. If we di¤erentiate (16) with respect to y, wm and
wf, and simplify, we obtain the second condition.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
If we consider any pair of commodity demands, say n1 and n2; we have
a corresponding pair of systems of equations (12)–(14). If we simplify, we
obtain the condition in the statement of the proposition.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof follows in stages. We prove that: A) the sharing rule can be
retrieved on the participation frontier, B) this identi…cation can be extended
on int(N); and C) testable restrictions are generated.
A) Frontier solution: Along the participation frontier, by the continuity of
the wife’s labour supply, we have the following identity:
¸
f(°(wm;y);À(wm;y)) = 0,
where À(wm;y) is in…nitely di¤erentiable. If we di¤erentiate this identity with





°y ¢ Àwm = °wm ¢ Ày: (18)
Then we use this expression and di¤erentiate the nth commodity demand
along the direction dÀ = 0. We obtain the husband’s Engel curve: ³
mn
?½m =
29An. We di¤erentiate this expression again to obtain:
³
mn





?½m½m ¢ (1 ¡Ày) = A
n
y: (20)
Finally, using (18) and solving this system yields
Àwm = 1 ¡ A
n
wm ¢ B









These equations de…ne the sharing rule up to an additive constant along the
participation frontier.
B) Interior solution: We di¤erentiate the nth commodity demand with re-




?½f to obtain a partial di¤er-
ential equation in ½wf, ½wm and ½y :
( ¹ C
n
wm ¡ ¹ C
n
y ) ¢ ½wf ¡ ¹ C
n
wf ¢ ½wm + ¹ C
n
wf ¢ ½y = 0: (22)
>From standard theorems of the partial di¤erential equation theory (e.g.,
John (1983)), the partial di¤erential equation (22) together with the speci…-
cation of the sharing rule on the boundary completely determines the wife’s
share ½ for any (wf;wm;y) 2 N, provided that a regularity condition is sat-
is…ed. First, let us remark that the partial di¤erential equation (22) can be
written as
u ¢ r½ = 0,
where r½ is the gradient of ½ and u is the vector ( ¹ Cn
wm ¡ ¹ Cn
y ;¡ ¹ Cn
wf; ¹ Cn
wf).
Now, the condition is that the vectoru is tangent to the participation frontier.
Since the equation of this frontier is wf ¡ °(wm;y) and given that, on the
frontier, ¹ C coincides with ^ C, this condition becomes:
^ C
n
wm 6= ^ C
n
y :
Formally, this result is local rather than global. Additional conditions are
required to identify the sharing rule on the entire set N. These conditions
are not speci…ed here.
C) Constraints: Di¤erentiating (21) with respect toy and wm and simplifying
yields the condition in the statement of the proposition. There exists another
testable constraint if we examine the di¤erentiability in the direction of the
non-participation set. Thelatterhas amorecomplex formand isnotspeci…ed
here.
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